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We evaluate the effect of the Federal Reserve’s purchase of long-term Treasuries and other long-term
bonds ("QE1" in 2008-2009 and "QE2" in 2010-2011) on interest rates. Using an event-study methodology
we reach two main conclusions. First, it is inappropriate to focus only on Treasury rates as a policy
target because QE works through several channels that affect particular assets differently. We find
evidence for a signaling channel, a unique demand for long-term safe assets, and an inflation channel
for both QE1 and QE2, and an MBS pre-payment channel and a corporate bond default risk channel
for QE1. Second, effects on particular assets depend critically on which assets are purchased. The
event-study suggests that (a) mortgage-backed securities purchases in QE1 were crucial for lowering
mortgage-backed security yields as well as corporate credit risk and thus corporate yields for QE1,
and (b) Treasuries-only purchases in QE2 had a disproportionate effect on Treasuries and Agencies
relative to mortgage-backed securities and corporates, with yields on the latter falling primarily through
the market’s anticipation of lower future federal funds rates.
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The  Federal  Reserve  has  recently  pursued  the  unconventional  policy  of  purchasing  large 
quantities of long-term securities, including Treasuries, Agency bonds, and Agency Mortgage 
Backed Securities (quantitative easing, or “QE”). The stated objective of quantitative easing is to 
reduce long-term interest rates in order to spur economic activity.
3  There is significant evidence 
that QE policies can alter long-term interest rates.  For example, Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and 
Sack (2010) present an event-study of QE1 that documents large reductions in interest rates on 
dates associated with positive QE announcements.  Swanson (2011) presents confirming event-
study evidence from the 1961 Operation Twist, where the Fed/Treasury purchased a substantial 
quantity of long-term Treasuries.  Apart from the event-study evidence, there are papers that look 
at lower frequency variation in the supply of long-term Treasuries and documents causal effects 
from supply to interest rates (see, for example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010)).
4 
  While it is clear from this body of work that QE lowers medium and long-term interest 
rates, the channels through which this reduction occurs are less clear.  The main objective of this 
paper is to evaluate these channels and their implications for policy. We review the principal 
theoretical channels through which QE may operate. We then examine the event-study evidence 
with an eye towards distinguishing among these channels, studying a range of interest rates and 
drawing in additional facts from various derivatives prices to help separate the channels. We 
furthermore supplement previous work by adding evidence from QE2 and evidence based on 
intra-day data. Studying intra-day data allows us to document price reactions and trading volume 
in  the  minutes  after  the  main  announcements,  thus  increasing  confidence  that  any  effects 
documented in daily data are causal. 
  It is necessary to understand the channels of operation in order to evaluate whether a 
given QE policy was successful. Here is an illustration of this point:  Using annual data back to 
1919,  Krishnamurthy  and  Vissing-Jorgensen  (2010)  present  evidence  for  a  channel  whereby 
changes in long-term Treasury supply drives the safety premia on near zero default risk long-
term  assets.  Their  findings  suggest  that  QE  policy  that  purchases  very  safe  assets  such  as 
Treasuries or Agency bonds should work particularly to lower the yields of bonds which are 
                                                           
3 http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2010/dud101001.html 
4 Other papers in the literature that have examined Treasury supply and bond yields include Bernanke, Reinhart and 
Sack (2004), Greenwood and Vayanos (2010), D’Amico and King (2010), Hamilton and Wu (2010), and Wright 
(2011).  3 
 
extremely safe, such as Treasuries, Agency bonds and high-grade corporate bonds.  But, even if 
a policy affects Treasury interest rates, such rates may not be the most policy relevant ones.  A 
lot of economic activity is funded by debt that is not as free of credit risk as Treasuries or Aaas.  
For example, about 40 percent of corporate bonds are rated Baa or lower (for which our earlier 
work suggests that the demand for assets with near zero default risk does not apply). Similarly, 
mortgage-backed securities issued to fund household mortgages are less safe than Treasuries due 
to the substantial pre-payment risk involved in such securities. Whether yields on these less safe 
assets fall as much as those on very safe assets depends on whether QE succeeds in lowering 
default  risk/default  risk  premia  (for  corporate  bonds),  and  pre-payment  risk  premia  (for 
mortgage-backed securities).  
One of the principal findings of this paper is that the large reductions in mortgage rates 
due to QE1 appear to be driven partly by the fact that QE1 involved large purchases of agency 
MBS (thus reducing the price of mortgage-specific risk). In contrast, for QE2 which involved 
only Treasury purchases, we find a substantial impact on Treasury and Agency bond rates, but 
smaller effects on MBS rates and corporate rates. Furthermore, we find a substantial reduction in 
the default risk/default risk premium for corporate bonds only for QE1, suggesting that the QE1 
MBS purchases may also have helped drive down corporate credit risk and thus corporate yields 
(possibly via the resulting mortgage refinancing boom and its impact on the housing market and 
consumer spending). The main effect on corporate bonds and MBS in QE2 appears to be through 
a signaling channel, whereby financial markets interpreted QE as signaling lower federal funds 
rates going forward. This finding for QE2 raises the question of whether the main impact of a 
Treasuries-only QE may have been achievable with a Fed statement committing to lower federal 
funds rates, i.e. without the Fed putting its balance sheet at risk in order to signal lower future 
rates.  
  The next section of the paper lays out the channels through which QE may be expected to 
operate. We then present event studies of QE1 and QE2 in Section 3 and 4 to evaluate the 
channels.    We document that QE worked through several channels. First, a signaling channel 
(reflecting the market inferring information from QE announcement about future Federal funds 
rates)  significantly  lowered  yields  on  all  bonds,  with  effects  depending  on  bond  maturity. 
Second, the impact of quantitative easing on mortgage-based security (MBS) rates was large 
when QE involves MBS purchases, but not when it involves only Treasury purchases, indicating 4 
 
that another main channel for QE1 was to affect the equilibrium price of mortgage-specific risk. 
Third, default risk/default risk premia for corporate bonds fell for QE1 but not QE2, contributing 
to lower corporate rates. Fourth, yields on medium and long maturity safe bonds fell because of a 
unique clientele for safe nominal assets, and Fed purchases reduce the supply of such assets and 
hence increase the equilibrium safety-premium. Fifth, evidence from inflation swap rates and 
TIPS  show  that  expected  inflation  increased  due  to  both  QE1  and  QE2,  implying  larger 
reductions in real than nominal rates. Section 5 presents regression analysis building on our 
previous  work  in  Krishnamurthy  and  Vissing-Jorgensen  (2010)  to  provide  estimates  of  the 
expected effects of QE on interest rates via the safety channel. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Channels 
a.  Signaling Channel 
Eggertson and Woodford (2003) argue that non-traditional monetary policy can have a beneficial 
effect in lowering long-term bond yields only if such policy serves as a credible commitment by 
the central bank to keep interest rates low even after the economy recovers (i.e., lower than what 
a Taylor rule may call for).  Clouse, et. al. (2000) argue that such a commitment can be achieved 
when the central bank purchases a large quantity of long duration assets in QE.  If the central 
bank raises rates, it takes a loss on these assets.  To the extent that the central bank weighs such 
losses  in  its  objective  function,  purchasing  long-term  assets  in  QE  serves  as  a  credible 
commitment  to  keep  interest  rates  low.  Furthermore,  some  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
announcements regarding QE explicitly contain discussion of the Federal Reserve’s policy on 
future federal funds rates.  Markets may also infer that the Fed’s willingness to undertake an 
unconventional policy like QE indicates that it will be willing to hold its policy rate low for an 
extended period. 
The signaling channel affects all bond market interest rates (with effects depending on 
bond maturity) since lower future federal funds rates, via the expectations hypothesis, can be 
expected to affect all interest rates. We examine this channel by measuring changes in the prices 
of the federal funds futures contract, as a guide to market expectations of future federal funds 
rates.
5  The signaling channel should have a larger impact in lowering intermediate maturity rates 
                                                           
5 Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) show that these futures prices reflect a risk premium, in addition to such 
expectations. The risk premium is smaller the lower short rates are and the stronger employment growth is. To the 5 
 
rather than long maturity rates, since the commitment to keep rates low only lasts until the 
economy recovers and the Fed can sell the accumulated assets.  
 
b.  Duration Risk Channel 
Vayanos and Vila (2009) offer a theoretical model for a duration risk channel. Their one-factor 
model produces a risk premium on a bond of maturity t that is approximately the product of the 
duration of a maturity t bond and the price of duration risk, which in turn is a function of the 
amount of duration risk borne by the marginal bond market investor and this investor’s risk 
aversion.  By purchasing long-term Treasuries, Agency debt, or Agency MBS, policy can reduce 
the duration risk in the hands of investors and thereby alter the yield curve, particularly reducing 
long-maturity bond yields relative to short-maturity yields.  To deliver these results the model 
departs  from  a  frictionless  asset  pricing  model.    The  principal  departures  that  generate  the 
duration risk premium result are the assumptions that there is a subset of investors who have 
preferences for bonds of specific maturities (``preferred habitat demand’’) and another subset of 
investors who are arbitrageurs and who become the marginal investors for pricing duration risk.  
  An important but subtle issue in using the model to think about QE is to ask whether the 
preferred habitat demand applies narrowly to a particular asset class (e.g., only the Treasury 
market) or whether it applies broadly to all fixed income instruments.  For example, if some 
investors had a special demand for 10  year Treasuries, but not 10  year corporate bonds (or 
mortgages or bank loans), then the Fed’s purchase of 10 year Treasuries can be expected to 
affect Treasury yields more than corporate bond yields.  Vayanos and Vila (2009) do not take a 
stand on this issue.  Greenwood and Vayanos (2010) offer evidence for how a change in the 
relative supply of long-term versus short-term Treasuries affects the spread between long-term 
and short-term Treasury bonds.  This evidence also does not settle the issue, because it only 
focuses on Treasury data. 
  Recent studies on QE have interpreted the model as being about the broad fixed income 
market (see Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack, 2010), and that is how we proceed. Under this 
interpretation, the duration risk channel has two principal predictions: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
extent that this risk premium is reduced by QE, our estimates of the signaling effect are too large. It is difficult to 
assess whether changes in short rates or employment growth due to QE have the same effect as non-policy related 
change in these variables so we do not attempt to quantify any such bias. 6 
 
i.  QE decreases the yield on all long-term nominal assets, including Treasuries, Agency 
bonds, corporate bonds, and MBS. 
ii.  The effects are larger effects for longer duration assets. 
 
c.  Liquidity Channel 
The  QE  strategy  involves  purchasing  long-term  securities  and  paying  by  increasing  reserve 
balances.    Reserve  balances  are  a  more  liquid  asset  than  long-term  securities.    Thus,  QE 
increases the liquidity in the hands of investors and thereby decreases the liquidity premium on 
the most liquid bonds 
  It is important to emphasize that this channel implies an increase in Treasury yields.  
That is, it is commonly thought that Treasury bonds carry a liquidity price premium, and that this 
premium has been high during particularly severe periods of the crisis.  An expansion in liquidity 
can be expected to reduce such a liquidity premium and increase yields.   This channel thus 
predicts that: 
i.  QE raises yields on the most liquid asset such as Treasuries, relative to other less 
liquid assets. 
 
d.  Safety Premium Channel 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) offer evidence that there are significant clienteles 
for long-term safe (i.e., near zero-default-risk) assets that lower the yields on such assets. The 
evidence comes from relating the spread between Baa bonds and Aaa bonds (or Agency bonds) 
to variation in the supply of long-term Treasuries, over a period from 1925 to 2008.  They report 
that when there are less long-term Treasuries, so that there are less long-term safe assets to meet 
clientele demands, the spread between Baa and Aaa bonds  rises. The safety channel  can be 
thought of as describing a preferred habitat of investors, but only applying to the space of safe 
assets.    
  The safety channel is not the same as the risk premium of a standard asset pricing model; 
it reflects a deviation due to clientele demand.  A simply way to think about investor willingness 
to pay extra for assets with very low default risk is to plot an asset’s price against its expected 
default rate. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) argue that this curve is very steep for 
low  default  rates,  with  a  slope  that  flattens  as  the  supply  of  Treasuries  increases.  Figure  1 7 
 
illustrates the distinction.  The bottom line is the C-CAPM value of a risky bond. As default risk 
rises,  the price  of the bond falls.   The distance from  this  line up to the middle (solid) line 
illustrates the safety premium; for bonds that have very low default, the bond price rises as a 
function of the safety of the bond.   The figure also illustrates  the dependence of the safety 
premium on the supply of long-term Treasuries.  The distance from the bottom line to the top 
line is the safety premium for a smaller supply of safe assets.  The clientele demand shifts the 
premium up due to a higher marginal willingness to pay for safety when supply is lower.  This 
dependence on the premium on the supply of long-term Treasuries is how Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) distinguish a standard risk premium explanation of defaultable bond 
pricing with the clientele-driven safety demand. 
  This same effect may be expected to play out in QE.  However, there is a subtle issue in 
thinking about different asset classes in QE: Treasury and Agency bonds are clearly safe in the 
sense of offering an almost sure nominal payment (note that the government ``takeover’’ of 
Fannie  Mae  and  Fredidie  Mac  was  announced  on  9/7/2008  prior  to  QE1  and  QE2,  making 
agency bonds particularly safe during the period of QE1 and QE2); however Agency MBS has 
significant prepayment risk which means that it may not meet clientele safety demands. The 
safety channel thus predicts that: 
i.  QE involving Treasuries and Agencies lowers the yields on very safe assets such as 
Treasuries, Agencies, and possible high-grade corporate bonds, relative to less safe 
assets such as lower-grade corporate bonds or bonds with prepayment risk such as 
MBS. 
  We expect Baa bonds to be the relevant cutoff for these safety effects. First, such bonds 
are the boundary between investment grade and non-investment grade securities, so that if driven 
by  safety  clientele  demands,  the  Baa  bond  forms  a  natural  threshold.    More  rigorously, 
Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2006) use credit default swap data from December 2000 to October 
2001  to  show  that  the  component  of  yields  that  is  hard  to  explain  by  purely  default  risk 
information is about 50 bps for Aaa and Aa rated bonds, and about 70 bps for lower-rated bonds, 
suggesting that the cutoff for bonds whose yields are not affected by safety premia is somewhere 




e.  Prepayment Risk Premium Channel 
QE1 involved the purchase of $1.25tn of Agency MBS.  Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron 
(2007)  present  theory  and  evidence  that  mortgage  prepayment  risk  carries  a  positive  risk 
premium, and that this premium depends on the quantity of prepayment risk borne by mortgage 
investors. The theory requires that the MBS market is segmented and that a class of arbitrageurs 
who operate predominantly in the MBS market are the relevant investors in determining the 
pricing of prepayment risk.  This theory is similar to the Vayanos and Vila (2009) explanation of 
the duration risk premium, and more broadly fits into theories of intermediary asset pricing (see 
He and Krishnamurthy, 2010). 
  This channel is particularly about QE1 and its effects on MBS yields, which reflect a 
prepayment risk premium: 
i.  MBS purchases in QE1 lowers MBS yields relative to other bond market yields.  
ii.  No such effect should be present in QE2. 
 
f.  Default Risk Channel 
Lower grade bonds such as Baa bonds carry higher default risk than Treasury bonds.  QE may 
affect the quantity of such default risk as well as the price (i.e. risk premium) of the default risk. 
If QE succeeds in stimulating the economy, we can expect that the default risk of corporations 
will fall, and hence Baa rates will fall.  Moreover, standard asset pricing models predict that 
investor risk aversion will fall as the economy recovers, implying a lower default risk premium.  
Finally, extensions of the intermediary pricing arguments we have offered above for pricing 
prepayment risk can imply that increasing health/capital in the intermediary sector can further 
lower the risk premium on default risk. 
We  use  credit-default  swap  (CDS)  rates  to  evaluate  the  importance  of  a  default  risk 
channel. A credit default swap is a financial derivative used to hedge against default by a firm.  
The “credit default swap rate” measures the percentage of face-value that must be paid as an 
annual insurance premium to insure against default on the bonds of a given firm.  The 5-year 
CDS refers to an insurance contract that expires in 5 years, while the 10-year CDS refers to the 




g.  Inflation Channel 
To the extent that QE is expansionary it increases inflation expectations, and this can be expected 
to have an effect on interest rates.  In addition, some commentators have argued that QE may 
increase tail risks surrounding inflation.
6  That is, in an environment where investors are unsure 
about  the  effects  of  policy  on  inflation,  policy  actions  may  lead  to  greater  uncertainty  over 
inflation outcomes.  Others have argued that aggressive policy decreases uncertainty in the sense 
that it effectively combats the possibility of a deflationary spiral.  Ultimately, this is an issue that 
can only be sorted out by data. We propose looking at the implied volatility on interest rate 
options, since a rise in inflation uncertainty will plausibly also lead to a rise in interest rate 
uncertainty and implied volatility. The inflation channel thus predicts: 
i. QE increases the rate on inflation swaps as well inflation expectations as measured by 
the difference between nominal bond yields and TIPS. 
ii. QE may increase or decrease interest rate uncertainty as measured by the implied 
volatility on swaptions. 
 
Two  explanations  are  in  order  on  the  measurements  in  (i)  and  (ii):    First,  a  (zero-coupon) 
inflation swap is a financial instrument used to hedge against a rise in inflation.  The swap is a 
contract  between  a  “fixed  rate  payor”  and  a  “floating  rate  payor”  that  specifies  a  one-time 
exchange of cash at the maturity of the contract.  The floating rate payor pays the realized 
cumulative inflation over the life of the swap as measured using the CPI index. The fixed rate 
payor makes a fixed payment, contracted at the initation of the swap agreement.  In an efficient 
market, the fixed rate payment thus measures the expected inflation rate over the life of the swap. 
Second,  a  swaption  is  a  financial  derivative  on  interest  rates.    The  buyer  of  a  call 
swaption earns a profit when the interest rate rises relative to the strike on the swaption.   As with 
any option, following on the Black-Scholes model, the expected volatility of interest rates enters 
as an important input for pricing the swaption.  The implied volatility is the expected volatility of 
interest rates as implied from current market prices of swaptions. 
 
h.  Summary 
                                                           
6 See Calomiris and Tallman, 2010, op-ed, “In Monetary Targeting, Two Tails are Better than One.” 10 
 
The channels we have discussed and our empirical approach can be summarized with a few 
equations.  Suppose that we are interested in the real yield on a T-year long-term, risky, and 
illiquid asset such as a corporate bond or a mortgage backed security.  Denote this yield by 
                           Also, denote the expected average interest rate over the next T years on 
short-term safe and liquid nominal bonds as   [                       ], and the expected inflation 
rate over the same period as       Then we can decompose the long-term rate as: 
 
                            [                       ]      
                                         
                                         
                                       
                                           
                                                . 
 
Each line in this equation reflects a channel we have discussed.  The first line is the expectations 
hypothesis terms. The long-term rate reflects the expected average future real interest rate.  The 
signaling  channel  for  QE  may  affect                            through  the  first  line.    Expected 
inflation can also be expected to affect long-term real rates. The second term reflects a duration 
risk premium that is a function of duration and the price of duration risk, as explained above. 
This decomposition is analogous to the textbook treatment of the CAPM, where the return on a 
given asset is decomposed as the asset’s β multiplied by the market risk premium.  The third 
term  is  the  illiquidity  premium  we  have  discussed,  which  is  likewise  related  to  an  asset’s 
liquidity multiplied by the market price of liquidity.  The next terms reflect the safety premium 
(the extra yield on the non-safe bond because it doesn’t have the extreme safety of a Treasury 
bond), a premium on default risk, and for the case of MBS, a premium on prepayment risk.  
The equation makes clear that a given interest rate can be affected by QE through a 
variety of channels.  It is not possible to examine the change in say the Treasury rate to conclude 
how much QE affects interest rates more broadly because different interest rates are affected by 
QE in different ways.    
(Eq. 1) 11 
 
Our main empirical methodology to examining the various channels can be thought of as 
difference-in-difference  approach  supplemented  with  information  from  derivatives.    For 
example, in asking whether there is a liquidity channel that may affect interest rates, we consider 
the yield spread between a long-term Agency bond and a long-term Treasury bond and measure 
how this yield spread changes over the relevant QE event.  The yield decomposition from Eq. 1 
for each of these bonds is identical, except for the term involving liquidity. That is, these bonds 
have the same duration, safety, default risk, etc., but the Treasury bond is more liquid than the 
Agency bond.   Thus the difference in yield changes between these bonds isolates a liquidity 
channel.  We examine how this yield spread changes over the QE event dates.   We take this 
difference-in-difference approach in evaluating the liquidity, safety, duration risk premium, and 
prepayment risk channels. In addition to the difference-in-difference approach, in some cases we 
use derivatives prices, which are affected by only a single channel, to separate out the effect of a 
particular channel.  This is how we use the federal funds futures contracts, the CDS swap rates, 
the inflation swap rates, and the implied volatility on interest rate options. 
 
3. Evidence from QE1 
a.  Event Study 
Gagnon, et. al., (2010) provide an event study of QE1 based on the announcements of long-term 
asset purchases by the Federal Reserve in the late-2008 to 2009 period (“QE1”).  QE1 included 
purchase of mortgage-backed securities, Treasury securities and Agency securities.  Gagnon, et. 
al., (2010) identify eight event dates beginning with the 11/25/08 announcement of the Fed’s 
intent to purchase $500bn of Agency MBS and $100bn of Agency debt, and running into the 
summer  of  2009.    We  focus  on  the  first  five  of  these  event  dates  (11/25/2008,  12/1/2008, 
12/16/2008, 1/28/2009, and 3/18/2009), leaving out three later event dates on which only small 
yield changes occurred. 
  There was considerable turmoil in financial markets in the period from the fall of 2008 to 
the spring of 2009, which makes inference from an event-study somewhat tricky.  Some of the 
assets we consider, such as corporate bonds and CDS, are less liquid than Treasuries. During a 
period  of  low  liquidity,  the  prices  of  such  assets  may  react  slowly  in  response  to  an 
announcement.  We deal with this issue by presenting two-day changes for all assets (from the 
day prior to the day after the announcement). In the data, for high liquidity assets like Treasuries, 12 
 
two-day changes are almost the same as one-day changes. For low liquidity assets, the two-day 
changes are almost always higher than one-day changes.  
  The second issue that arises is that we cannot be sure that the identified events are in fact 
important events, or the dominant events for the identified event day.  That is, other significant 
economic news arrives through this period and potentially creates measurement error problems 
for the event-study. To increase our confidence that QE1 announcements were the dominant 
news on the five event  dates  we study,  Figure 2  presents  graphs  of intraday movements  in 
Treasury yields and trading volume for each of the QE1 event dates. The figure is based on data 
from BG Cantor and the data graphed is for the on-the-run 10 year Treasury bond at each date. 
Yields  graphed  are  averages  by  the  minute  and  trading  volume  graphed  is  total  volume  by 
minute. The vertical lines indicate the minute of the announcement, defined as the minute of the 
first article covering the announcement in Factiva. These graphs show that the events identify 
significant  movements  in  Treasury  yields  and  Treasury  trading  volume  and  that  the 
announcements do appear to be the main piece of news coming out on the event days, especially 
on 12/1/2008, 12/16/2008 and 3/18/2009. For 11/25/2008 and 1/28/2009, the trading volume 
graphs also suggest that the announcements are the main events, with more mixed evidence from 
the yield graphs for those days.  
  While it is likely that these five dates are most relevant event dates, it is possible that 
there are other “true” event dates that we have omitted.  How does focusing on too limited a set 
of event dates affect inference?   For the objective of analyzing through which channels QE 
operates, omitting true event dates reduces the power of our tests by increasing the noise in the 
sample,  but  does  not  lead  to  any  biases.
7  For  estimating  the  overall  effect  of  QE,  omitting 
potentially relevant dates could lead to an upward or downward bias depending on how  the 
omitted dates affected the market’s perception of the probability or magnitude of QE.  
  Table  1  presents  data  on  two-day  changes  in  Treasury,  (non-callable)  Agency,  and 
Agency MBS yields around the main event-study dates, spanning a period from 11/25/08 (the 
two-day change from 11/24/08 to 11/26/08) to 3/18/09 (the two-day change from 3/17/09 to 
3/19/09).  Over  this  period  it  became  evident  from  Fed  announcements  that  the  government 
intended to purchase a large quantity of long-term securities. Across the five event dates, interest 
                                                           
7 We thank Gabriel Chodorow-Reich for clarifying this point. 13 
 
rates fell across the board on long-term bonds, consistent with a contraction of supply effect. 
Now consider the channels through which the supply effect may have worked.   
  In all tables we provide tests of the statistical significance of the rate changes or changes 
in derivatives documented, focusing on the total change shown in the last row of each table (for 
QE1 and QE2 separately). Specifically, we test whether changes on QE announcement days 
differ from changes on other days. To do this, we regress the daily changes for the variable in 
focus on 6 dummies: A dummy for whether there was a QE1 announcement on this day, a 
dummy for whether there was a QE1 announcement on the previous day, a dummy for whether 
there  was  a  QE2  announcement  on  this  day,  a  dummy  for  whether  there  was  a  QE2 
announcement on the previous day, a dummy for whether there was a QE3 announcement on this 
day, a dummy for whether there was a QE3 announcement on the previous day. By ``QE3’’ we 
refer to the Fed announcement in its FOMC statement on 9/21/2011 (this event happened after 
the Brookings panel took place but we analyze it briefly below). This regression is estimated on 
daily data from the start of 2008 to the end of the third quarter of 2011, using OLS but with 
robust standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity. F-tests for the QE dummy coefficients 
being zero are then used to assess statistical significance. When testing for statistical significance 
of 2-day changes, the F-test is a test of whether the sum of the coefficient on the QE dummy 
(QE1 or QE2) and the coefficient on the dummy for a QE announcement (QE1 or QE2) on the 
previous day, is equal to zero. When testing statistical significance of two-day changes in CDS 
rates we follow a slightly different approach described below due to the way our CDS rates 
changes are constructed.  
 
b.  Signaling Channel 
Figure 3 graphs the yields on the monthly federal funds futures contract, for contract maturities 
from March 2009 to October 2010.  The pre-announcement average yield curves are computed 
on the day before each of the five QE1 events and then averaged across these dates.  The post-
announcement average yield curve is computed likewise based on the five days after the QE1 
event dates.  Dividing the downward shift from the initial to the post-announcement average 
yield curve by the slope of the initial average yield curve, and multiplying by the number of 
event dates tells us how much the policy shifted the rate cycle forward in time. The graph shows 
that, on average, each QE announcement “shifts” an anticipated rate hike cycle by the Fed later 14 
 
by a little over one month. Evaluating the forward shift at the point and slope of the March 2010 
contract, the total effect of the five QE announcements is to shift anticipated rate increases later 
by 6.3 months.  This effect is consistent with the signaling channel whereby the Fed’s portfolio 
purchases  (as  well  as  direct  indications  of  the  stance  of  policy  in  the  relevant  Fed 
announcements) signals a commitment to keep the federal funds rate low. 




month,  and  24
th  month  futures  contracts,  across  the  five  event  dates.  We  aggregate  by,  for 
example, the 3
rd month rather than a given contract-month (e.g., March), because it is more 
natural to think of the information in each QE announcement as concerning how long from today 
rates will be held low (on the other hand, for plotting a yield curve it is more natural to hold the 
contract-month fixed, as we did above in Figure 3).   For two of the four Fed funds futures 
contracts two-day changes for QE1 announcement dates are significantly more negative than on 
other days. The two-day decrease in the 24
th month contract is 40 basis points. 
How much effect can the signaling channel have on longer term rates?  The difficulty in 
assessing the effects on longer rates is that we cannot precisely measure changes in the expected 
future federal funds rates for horizons over 2  years due to the lack of  federal funds futures 
contracts.  An upper bound on the signaling effect can be found by extrapolating the 40 bps fall 
in the 24
th month contract to all horizons.  This is an upper bound because it is clear that at 
longer  horizons,  market  expectations  should  reflect  a  normalization  of  the  accommodative 
current  Fed  policy  so  that  signaling  should  not  have  any  effect  on  rates  at  that  horizon. 
Nevertheless, with the 40bp number, equation 1 predicts that rates at all horizons fall by 40bps.    
A second approach to estimating the signaling effect is to build on the observation that 
QE shifted the path of anticipated rate hikes by about 6 months. Signaling affects long term rates 
by  changing  the  expectations  term  in  equation  1,   [                       ]   Consider  the 
expectations term for a T-year bond: 
 [                       ]   
 
 
∫   
     
 
   
 
where,   
   is the expected federal funds rate t years from today.   Let us use         
    to denote the 
path described by the federal funds rate as expected by the market prior to QE announcements. 
Suppose that QE policy signals that the rate is going to be held at         
   for the next X months, 15 
 
and thereafter follow the path indicated by         
    (such that the rate at time t with the policy in 
place is what the rate would have been X months earlier absent the policy).  That is, QE simply 
shifts an anticipated rate hike cycle later by X months.  Then, the decrease in the expectations 
term for a T-year bond is, 
  [                       ]   
 
 
∫          
             
        
 
        
 
The first point to note from this equation is that it indicates that the signaling effect is 
decreasing in maturity (i.e. T).   Here is a rough check on how large the signaling effect can be.  
Suppose that         
    is 0%, which is as low as the federal funds rate traded over this period. 
Consider the         
    term next. The 2-year federal funds futures contract, which is the longest 
contract traded, indicated a yield as high as 1.5% over  the period from 11/08 to 3/09.   But 
expected federal funds rates out to say 10 years are likely to be much higher than that.   Over the 
QE1 period the yield curve between 10 and 30 years was relatively flat, with levels of Treasury 
rates at 10 and 30 years as high as almost 4%.  Thus, consider a value of         
    of 4% to get an 
upper bound on this signaling effect. Then, for a 10 year bond, the change is 20bps, while for a 
30 year bond, the change is about 7bps.  At the 5-year horizon, given the slope of the yield curve, 
        
    is lower than 4%.  We use 3.5%, which is based on computing forward rates between 
year 4 and 7 using the 3, 5 and 7 year Treasury yields, implying a signaling effect of 35bps for 
the 5-year horizon.  Our two ways of computing the signaling effect indicates moves in the range 
of 20 to 40 bps out to 10 years. This effect potentially explains the moves in the CDS-adjusted 
Baa rates of 41bps (long) and 25bps (intermediate).  It also can help explain the fall in the 1-year 
Treasury yield of 25 bps. 
On the other hand, longer term rates move much more substantially than shorter term 
rates.  Longer term Treasuries and Agencies fall 73 to 200 bps, and much more than the 1- year 
bond yield.  For the corporate bonds of Table 2, however, there is no apparent maturity effect 
(for a given ratings category).  Thus, to understand the more substantial movements of long-term 





c.  Duration Risk Channel 
Consistent with the duration risk hypothesis, the yields of many longer term bonds in Table 1 fall 
more than the yields of shorter maturity bonds.  The exceptions here are the 30 year Treasury and 
Agency bonds, where the yields falls less than the 10 year bond.  Note that given that mortgages 
amortize and carry prepayment risk, the duration on the 30 year MBS is around 7 years and thus 
more comparable to a 10 year bond than a 30 year bond.    
There is other evidence that the duration risk channel cannot explain. There are dramatic 
differences in the yield changes across the different asset classes. Agency bonds, for example, 
experience the largest fall in yields.  The duration risk channel cannot speak to these effects as it 
only prescribes effects that depend on bond maturity.  The corporate bond data also cannot be 
explained  by  the  duration  risk  channel.    Table  2  presents  data  on  corporate  bond  yields  of 
intermediate duration (around 4 year duration) or long duration (around 10 year duration), as 
well as these same yields with the impact of changes in CDS rates taken out. We adjust the yield 
changes using CDS changes to remove any effects due to a changing default risk premium and 
thereby isolate duration risk premium effects. We construct CDS rate changes by rating category 
as follows. We obtain company-level CDS rates from Credit Market Analysis via Datastream. 
We classify companies into ratings categories based on the value-weighted average rating of the 
company’s senior debt with remaining maturity above 1 year, using bond information from the 
Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD) and the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine 
(TRACE). For each QE date we then calculate the company level CDS rate change and the 
value-weighted  average  of  these  changes  by  ratings  category,  with  weights  based  on  the 
company’s senior debt with remaining maturity above 1 year (and with weights calculated based 
on market values on the day prior to the event day).
 8  The reason for calculating company level 
CDS  changes  and  then  averaging  across  companies  (call  this  ``method  1’’),  as  opposed  to 
calculating average CDS rates across companies and then the change over time in the averages  
(call this ``method 2’’) is that we only have CDS data for a subset of companies, between 362 
                                                           
8 We drop CDS rates for AIG. According to our calculations, this firm is the largest in ratings category Baa 
by market value of bonds outstanding and has a very large CDS rate increase on our last QE1 date. With 
AIG included, the two-day CDS changes for category Baa (summed across the 5 QE1 dates) are 32 rather 
than 40 at the 10-year horizon and 37 rather than 51 at the 5-year horizon. We are not sure whether 
AIG is still included in the Barclays bond indices during this period, given the government intervention 
for this firm. 
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and 378 for each QE1 date (and around 338 for the two main QE2 dates we study below). This is 
likely much fewer than the number of companies for which bond yields are included in the 
corporate bond indices from Barclays that we use. Therefore, if we used method 2, the CDS 
calculations  for  a  given  ratings  category  would  be  fairly  sensitive  to  whether  a  particular 
company is down- or up-graded on a given day (and more so than the bond yield indices). We 
avoid this problem by using method 1 since a given time change is then calculated using CDS 
rates for a fixed set of companies. A side effect of using method 1 is that the sum of two daily 
CDS changes for a given ratings category (each averages of one-day changes across companies) 
will not equal the two-day CDS change for this category (calculated by averaging two-changes 
across companies). Therefore, to assess the statistical significance of two-day CDS changes for a 
given ratings category we estimate a regression where the dependent variable is the two-day 
CDS change (from date t-1 to t+1) and the independent variables are a dummy for whether day t 
is a QE1 announcement day and a dummy for whether day t is a QE2 announcement day. To 
keep statistical inference simple, we only use data for every second day (as opposed to using 
overlapping two-day changes). We make sure that all QE announcement dates are included (if a 
given QE date falls on a date that would otherwise not be used, we include the QE date and drop 
the day prior and the day after the QE date). We have CDS data only up to the end the third 
quarter of 2010, so we estimate the regression using data from the start of 2008 to the end of 
2010:Q3.    We  use  the  same  regression  for  two-day  changes  when  assessing  the  statistical 
significance of two-day yield changes adjusted for CDS-changes.
  
The  CDS  adjustment  makes  a  substantial  difference  in  interpreting  the  corporate  bond 
evidence in terms of the duration risk channel.  In particular, there is a large fall in CDS rates for 
lower grade bonds on the event dates, suggesting that default risk/risk premia fell substantially 
with QE, consistent with the default risk channel (we discuss this further below).  Given the CDS 
adjustment, the change in the yield of the Baa bond can be fully accounted for by the signaling 
channel.  Moreover, there is no apparent pattern across long and intermediate maturities in the 
changes in CDS-adjusted corporate bond yields.  These observations suggest that we need to 





d.  Liquidity Channel 
The most liquid assets in Table 1 are the Treasury bonds.  The liquidity channel predicts that 
these yields should increase with QE, relative to the yields on less liquid bonds. Consistent with 
this, Treasury yields fall much less than the yields on Agency bonds which are less liquid.  That 
is, the Agency-Treasury spread falls with QE. For example, the 10 year spread falls by 200-
107=93 basis points.  This is a relevant comparison because 10 year Agencies and Treasuries 
have  similar  default  risk  (especially  since  the  government  placed  FNMA  and  FHLMC  into 
conservatorship in  September 2008), and are duration matched.  Thus this  spread isolates a 
liquidity  premium.    Consistent  with  the  liquidity  channel,  we  see  that  the  equilibrium  price 
premium (yield discount) for liquidity falls substantially in economic terms. To test whether 
agency yield changes are statistically significantly larger than Treasury yield changes on the QE1 
dates  we  use  the  difference  between  agency  yield  changes  and  Treasury  yield  changes  as 
dependent variable in the regression laid out in section 3.a and find that this is the case for all 
maturities shown (3, 5, 10, and 30 years) at the 5 percent level. 
 
e.  Safety Channel 
The non-callable Agency bonds will be particularly sensitive to the safety effect.  These bonds 
are not as liquid as the Treasury bonds, but do have almost the same safety as Treasuries. Of the 
channels we have laid out, agency bond yields are mainly affected via the signaling channel, the 
duration risk premium channel, and the safety channel. We have argued that the duration risk 
premium channel is not substantial, and that the signaling channel accounts for at most a 40 bps 
decline in yields on QE1 dates. The fall in 10 year Agency yields is 200 bps, which is the largest 
effect in the table.  This suggests that the safety channel impact on Agency and Treasury yields is 
one of the dominant channels for QE1, at least 160 bps for the 10-year bonds.
9 To test whether 
agency yield changes are statistically significantly larger on the QE1 dates than the signaling 
                                                           
9 When inferring the size of the safety channel from comparing agency yield changes and changes in 
federal funds futures, we implicitly are assuming that neither is affected by changes in the overall supply 
of liquidity in QE1. This is plausible if (a) agencies are not (to a substantial extent) valued for their 
liquidity and do not change price in response to a change in the supply of liquidity, (b) the federal funds 
futures we use are sufficiently far out in the future to not be affected by the high price of liquidity in the 
fall of 2008, and (c) the market expects any QE1 injected liquidity to be withdrawn by the time of the 
federal funds futures contract used. In terms of (b) and (c), these assumptions are plausible given that 
we focus on the 24th month federal funds futures. 19 
 
channel predicts we use the difference between agency yield changes and change in the 24-
month Fed funds futures contract yield as dependent variable in the regression laid out in section 
3.a and find that this is the case for all maturities shown (3, 5, 10, and 30 years) at the 5 percent 
level.   
As we have just noted, Treasuries fall less than the Agencies because the liquidity effect 
runs against the safety effect but the safety effect itself should affect Treasuries and Agencies 
about equally. 
  The corporate bond evidence is also consistent with a safety effect.  The CDS-adjusted 
yields on Aaa bonds, which are close to default free, fall much more than the CDS-adjusted Baa 
or B bonds.  The Aa and A bond are also affected by the safety effect, by a smaller amount as the 
safety channel predicts.  There is close to no effect on the non-investment grade bonds.
10 Finally, 
since Agencies are safer than Aaa corporate bonds, the safety channel prediction that the former 
bond yields fall more than the latter is also confirmed in the data. 
 
f.  Prepayment Risk Channel 
Agency MBS yields fall by 107 bps for 30-year bonds and 88 bps for 15-year bonds.  There are 
two  ways  to  interpret  this  evidence.    It  is  possible  that  this  is  due  to  a  safety  effect  –  the 
government guarantee behind these MBS may be worth a lot to investors so that these securities 
carry a safety premium.  The safety premium then rises, as with the Agency bonds, decreasing 
Agency MBS yields.  On the other hand, the Agency MBS carry significant prepayment risk and 
are unlikely to be viewed as safe in the same way as Agency bonds or Treasuries (where safety 
connotes the almost complete certainty of nominal repayment at known dates).   We think that a 
more  likely  explanation  is  market  segmentation  effects  as  in  Gabaix,  Krishnamurthy  and 
Vigneron (2007).  The government purchase of MBS reduces the prepayment risk in the hands of 
investors, and thereby reduces MBS yields.  The effect is higher for the 30 year than the 15 year 
because the longer bonds carry more prepayment risk. 
                                                           
10 The anomalously large moves in the CDS rates for the B category appear to be partly driven by Ford, 
perhaps related to news about the auto bailouts.  If we drop Ford from the tabulation, the 5-year CDS 
and 10-year CDS fall by 435 bps and 496 bps, respectively. 
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  Importantly, Fuster and Willen (2010) show that the large reductions on agency MBS 
rates  around  11/25/2008  were  quickly  followed  by  reductions  in  mortgage  rates  offered  by 
mortgage lenders to households. 
 
g.  Default Risk Channel 
We have noted earlier from Table 2 that QE appears to reduce default risk or default risk premia, 
which particularly affects the interest rates on lower grade corporate bonds. The table shows that 
CDS rates of the Aaa firms do not change appreciably with QE.  There is a clear pattern across 
the ratings, going from Aaa to B, whereby higher credit risk firms experience the largest fall in 
CDS rates. In terms of statistical significance, two-day changes in CDS rates are significantly 
more negative for QE1 announcement days than on other days for 4 of 6 ratings categories. This 
evidence suggests that QE had a significant effect on yields through default risk and default risk 
premia. 
 
h.  Inflation Channel 
The above analysis focuses on nominal rates (in particular, the effects on various nominal rates 
relative to the nominal signaling channel benchmark). To assess effects on real rates, one further 
needs  information  about  the  impact  of  QE1  on  inflation  expectations.   Table  3  presents  the 
relevant data. 
  The first columns in the table are for inflation swaps. The 10-year inflation swap is the 
fixed  rate  in  the  10-year  zero  coupon  inflation  swap,  and  thus  a  market-based  measure  of 
expected inflation over the next 10 years (see Fleckenstein, Longstaff and Lustig (2010) for 
information  on  the  inflation  swap  market).    This  data  suggests  that  inflation  expectations 
increased by between 35 and 96 basis points, depending on maturity. 
  The second set of columns present data on TIPS yields.  We compare these yield changes 
to  those from  nominal bonds  to  evaluate the change in  inflation expectations. Based on the 
evidence of the existence of significant liquidity premia on Treasuries, it is inappropriate to 
compare TIPS to nominal Treasuries. If investors’ safety demand did not apply to real safe bonds 
such as TIPS, then the appropriate nominal benchmark is the CDS-adjusted Baa bond. On the 
other hand, if long-term safety demand also encompassed TIPS, then it is more appropriate to 
use  the  CDS-adjusted  Aaa  bond  as  benchmark.  We  are  unaware  of  definitive  evidence  that 21 
 
settles the issue. From Table 1, the CDS-adjusted long maturity Aaa (Baa) bond falls in yield by 
70 (41) bps, while the intermediate maturity bond falls in yield by 82 (25) bps.  Matching the 70 
(41) bps change to the 187 bps change in the 10 year TIPS, we find that inflation expectations 
increased by 117 (146) bps at the 10 year horizon (both significant at the 1 percent level, using 
the  same  regression  to  test  significance  as  used  for  two-day  CDS-changes).  At  the  5  year 
horizon, based on the 82 (25) bps change in CDS-adjusted intermediate maturity Aaa (Baa) bond 
and 160 bps change in TIPS, we find that inflation expectations increased by 78 (135) bps (the 
first not significant and the second significant at the 5 percent level). Benchmarking to the Aaa 
bond produces results more similar to those from the inflation swaps.   
  Together these two sets of data suggest that the impact of Fed purchases of long-term 
assets on expected inflation was large and positive.  
  We also evaluate the inflation uncertainty channel.  The last column in Table 3 reports 
data on implied volatilities from interest rate swaptions (i.e., the option to enter into an interest 
rate swap). The data is the Barclays implied volatility index. The underlying maturity for the 
swap ranges from 1 year to 30 year, involving options that expire from 3 months to 20 years. The 
index is based on the weighted average of implied volatilities across the different swaptions.   
  The average volatility measure over the QE1 time period is 104 bps, so the fall of 38 bps 
is substantial.  Thus, it appears that QE1 reduced rather than increased inflation uncertainty.   
  The other explanation for this fall in volatility is segmented markets effects.  MBS have 
an embedded interest rate option that is often hedged by investors in the swaption market.  Since 
QE1 involved the purchase of MBS, investors have a smaller demand for swaptions and hence 
implied  volatility  on  swaptions  fall.    This  latter  explanation  is  often  the  one  given  by 
practitioners  for  changes  in  swaption  implied  volatilities.  Notice,  however,  that  volatility  is 
essentially unchanged on the first QE1 event date, which is the event that drives the largest 
changes in MBS yields. This could indicate that the segmented markets effects are not important, 
with volatility instead driven by the inflation uncertainty channel. 
 
 
i.  Summary 
QE1 significantly reduced yields on intermediate and long-maturity bonds.  There is evidence 
that  QE1  decreased  the  yields  on  bonds,  particularly  intermediate  maturity  bonds,  via  the 22 
 
signaling channel, with effects on 5 to 10 year bonds ranging from 20 to 40 bps. A preferred 
habitat  for  long-term  safe  assets,  including  Treasuries,  Agencies  and  highly-rated  corporate 
bonds appears to have generated a large impact of QE1 on the yields on these bonds, with effects 
as high as 160 bps for 10-year agency and Treasury bonds.  For riskier bonds such as lower 
grade corporate bonds and MBS, QE1 had effects through a reduction in default risk/default risk 
premia and a reduced prepayment risk premium. 10-year CDS rates on Baa corporate bonds fall 
by 40 on the QE1 dates. These effects on CDS rates and MBS pricing could be due to reductions 
in risk borne by the financial sector, consistent with limited intermediary capital models, or due 
to impacts via a mortgage refinancing boom and its impact on the housing market and consumer 
spending.  As for the duration risk premium channel, we find little evidence for this.  Finally, 
there is evidence that QE substantially increased inflation expectations, but reduced inflation 
uncertainty. The increase in expected inflation was large, with 10-year expected inflation up 
between 96 and 146 bps depending on the estimation approach used, implying that real rates fell 
dramatically for a wide variety of borrowers. 
  Finally, note that these effects are all sizable and probably much more than we should 
expect in general.  This is because the November 2008 to March 2009 period is an unusual 
financial-crisis period in which the demand for safe assets was heightened, segmented market 
effects were apparent across many markets, and intermediaries suffered from serious financing 
problems.  In such an environment, supply changes should be expected to have a large effect on 
interest rates.     
 
4. Evidence from QE2 
a.  Event Study 
We perform an event study of QE2 similar to that of QE1.  There are two relevant sets of events 
in QE2.  First, in the 8/10/2010 FOMC statement, the committee announces:  
 “the Committee will keep constant the Federal Reserve's holdings of securities at their current 
level  by  reinvesting  principal  payments  from  agency  debt  and  agency  mortgage-backed 
securities in longer-term Treasury securities.” 23 
 
Prior to this announcement, market expectations were that the Fed would let its MBS portfolio 
runoff,
11 thereby reducing reserve balances in the system and allowing the Fed to exit from its 
non-traditional monetary policies.  Thus, the announcement of the Fed’s intent to continue QE 
revised market expectations. Moreover, the announcement indicated that QE would shift towards 
longer-term Treasuries, and not Agencies or Agency MBS as in QE1.  As a back-of-the-envelope 
computation, suppose that the prepayment rate for the next year on $1.1tn of MBS was 20%.
12  
Then the announcement indicated that the Fed intended to purchase $220bn of Treasuries over 
the  next  one  year,  and  $176bn  over  the  subsequent  year,  etc.    It  is  unclear  from  the 
announcement how long the Fed expected to keep the re-investment strategy in place.  
The 9/21/10 FOMC announcement reiterates this message:  
“The Committee also will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its 
securities holdings.” 
The  second  type  of  information  for  QE2  pertains  to  the  Fed’s  intent  to  expand  its 
purchases  of  long-term  Treasury  securities.    In  the  9/21/10  FOMC  statement,  the  fourth 
paragraph states: 
“The Committee will continue to monitor the economic outlook and financial developments and 
is prepared to provide additional accommodation if needed to support the economic recovery 
[…]” (emphasis added) 
This  paragraph includes new language relative  to  the corresponding paragraph in  the 
8/10/2010 FOMC statement which read: “The Committee will continue to monitor the economic 
outlook and financial developments and will employ its policy tools as necessary to promote 
economic recovery and price stability.”  The new language in the 9/21/2010 statement follows 
the third paragraph of that statement in which the FOMC reiterates its intention to maintain its 
target for the federal funds rate and reiterates its policy of reinvesting principal payments from 
its securities holdings.  The new language was read by many market participants as indicating 
new  stimulus  by  the  Fed,  and  particularly  an  expansion  of  its  purchases  of  long-term 
Treasuries.  For example, Goldman Sachs economists in their market commentary on 9/21/2010 
refer to this language and conclude that the Fed intends to purchase up to $1 trillion of Treasuries 
                                                           
11  See  Fed  Chairman  Bernanke’s  Monetary  Policy  Report  to  Congress  on  July  21,  2010,  discussing  the 
"normalization” of monetary policy.  The issue is also highlighted in Bernanke’s testimony on March 25, 2010 on 
the Federal Reserve’s exit strategy. 
12 The Fed’s holdings of MBS on August 4, 2010 was $1,118bn, while it was $914bn on June 22, 2011 (source: H4 
report of the Federal Reserve). That is an annualized decline of 20.6%.   24 
 
(see “FOMC Rate Decision - Fed Signals Willingness to Ease Further if Growth or Inflation 
Continue to Disappoint,” 9/21/2010, Hatzius, McKelvey, Tilton and Stehn). 
The  following  announcement  from  the  11/3/2010  FOMC  statement  makes  such  an 
intention explicit: 
“The  Committee  will  maintain  its  existing  policy  of  reinvesting  principal  payments  from  its 
securities holdings. In addition, the Committee intends to purchase a further $600 billion of 
longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011.” 
The 11/3 announcement was widely anticipated. According to the Wall Street Journal, a 
WSJ  survey  of  private  sector  economists  in  early  October  of  2010  found  that  the  Fed  was 
expected to purchase about $750 billion in QE2.
13 We have noted above the expectation, as of 
9/21/2010, by Goldman Sachs’ economists of $1 trillion of purchases. Based on this, one would 
expect the 11/3/2010 announcement to have little effect (estimates in the press varied widely, but 
the actual number of $600 bn was in the range of numbers commonly mentioned).  
  Figure  4  presents  intraday  data  on  the  10-year  Treasury  bond  yield  around  the 
announcements  times  of  the  FOMC  statements.    The  8/10  announcement  appears  to  be 
significant news for the Treasury market, reducing the yield in a manner that suggest that market 
expectations over QE were revised up. The 9/21 announcement is qualitatively similar.  At the 
11/3 announcement, Treasury yields increased but then fell some. The reaction suggests that 
markets may have priced in more than a $600bn QE announcement. 
  In our event study, we aggregate across the 8/10 and 9/21 events, which seem clearly to 
be driven by upward revisions in QE expectations.  We do not add in the change from the 11/3 
announcement as it is unclear whether only the increase in yields after than announcement or 
also the subsequent decrease was due to QE2 (furthermore, the large two-day reaction to the 11/3 
announcement may not be due to QE2 since a lot of it happened the morning of 11/4 around the 
time new numbers were released for jobless claims and productivity). As noted in Section 3a, 
given our objective of understanding the channels of QE, it is important to focus on events that 
we can be sure are QE relevant.   
                                                           
13  WSJ, Oct 26, 2010, "Fed Gears Up for Stimulus".  
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  Additionally,  we  present  information  for  both  1-day  changes  and  2-day  changes,  but 
focus on the 1-day change in our discussion. This is because market liquidity had normalized by 
the fall of 2010, and looking at the 2-day changes would therefore likely add noise to the data. 
 
b.  Analysis 
Table 5 provides data on the changes in Treasury, Agency and Agency MBS yields over the 
event dates.  Table 6 provides data on changes in corporate bond yields, CDS, and CDS-adjusted 
corporate yields.   
Effects of QE2 on yields are consistently much smaller than the effects found for QE1. 
This  could  be  partially  due  to  omissions  of  relevant  additional  event  dates  for  QE2.  We 
considered  various  additional  events  (e.g.  speeches  by  Fed  officials)  but,  using  intra-day 
Treasury yield data, did not find any days with dramatic Treasury yield declines right around the 
events. This does not mean that considering only a few QE2 event dates captures all of the 
impact of QE2, only that the market may have updated its QE2 perceptions not only on Fed 
announcement dates but also on dates of bad economic news. Decomposing the yield impact of, 
for example, a GDP announcement into its ``standard effects’’ and its indirect effect due to its 
impact on the likelihood of QE is difficult and we do not pursue it. 
The fact that the effects of QE2 are fairly small makes it more difficult to discern all of 
the various channels in QE2 than in QE1. That said, here are some conclusions regarding the 
channels: 
 
  There  is  significant  evidence  of  the  signaling  channel.  The  12
th  month  federal  funds 
futures contract from Table 4 falls by 4 bps. The 24
th month contract falls by 11 bps.  
Extrapolating out from this 24
th month contract suggests that we can explain moves in 
longer term rates of up to 11 bps following our first approach outlined in our discussion 
of signaling for QE1. Turning to our second approach, Figure 5 plots the average pre- and 
post- QE2 yield curves from the federal funds futures contracts.  The graph suggests a 
shift later of the anticipated rate hike cycle.  We can again estimate how large this shift is. 
Because the slope of the futures curve from Figure 5 is not constant, the computation is 
sensitive to exactly which point you use to evaluate the time shift. Using the slope and 
vertical shift at July 2012, we estimate the time shift is 3.2 months, while using the slope 26 
 
and vertical shift at July 2011, we estimate the time shift at 2.1 months.  The 2.1 month 
number implies a fall in 5 year rates of 12 bps, a fall in 10 year rates of 8 bps, and a fall 
in 30 year rates of 2 bps.  The 3.2 month number implies a fall in 5 year rates of 18 bps, a 
fall in 10 year rates of 12 bps and a fall in 30 year rates of 4 bps. The fall of 18 bps in the 
5 year rate from this computation is too large relative to the 11 bps upper bound from our 
first approach, suggesting that the 2.1 month computation is more plausible. 
 
These numbers appear in line with the CDS adjusted corporate bond yield changes as 
well as the Agency MBS yield changes. Note also that the intermediate corporate rates 
(about 4 year duration) in Table 6 fall more than the long rates (10 year duration) and the 
15 year Agency MBS yields (3 year duration) from Table 5 fall more than the 30 year (7 
year duration). The durations for the corporate series are obtained from Datastream. The 
MBS durations are calculated based on the coupon rates of the MBS series and the fact 
that the MBS amortize. Both moves are consistent with the signaling channel. Thus, the 
signaling channel can plausibly explain all of the movements in the corporate bond rates 
and the Agency MBS yields. The only exception is for the Ba long and B long categories 
where the CDS appear to rise sharply with no corresponding effects on bond yields.  We 
are unsure of what is driving the CDS-bond basis for these categories.  
 
  Given that MBS yield changes are fully accounted for by the signaling channel, there is 
no evidence of a pre-payment risk channel for QE2. This is as would be expected given 
that  QE2  did  not  involve  MBS  purchases.  Similarly,  there  does  not  appear  to  be  a 
substantial duration risk premium channel. Given that the size of the signaling channel is 
roughly  the  same  as  the  decline  in  the  CDS-adjusted  corporate  rates,  there  is  no 
additional yield decline to be explained by a duration risk premium reduction. 
 
  There is also evidence for a safety channel. 10-year Agency yields and Treasury yields, 
which are both near zero default-risk fall in yield more than the CDS-adjusted corporate 
bond yields.  With a signaling effect for 10-year bonds of between 8 and 12 bps, and a 
fall in 10-year Treasury and agency bond yields of 17 to 18 bps, the safety effect is 




  There does not appear to be a liquidity channel.  Treasury and Agency yields fall by 
nearly  the  same  amounts,  so  that  their  spread,  which  can  measure  liquidity,  appears 
unchanged. This result is plausible because liquidity premia in markets were quite low in 
late 2010, as market liquidity conditions had normalized. Consider the following data (on 
08/10/2010): 
 
  Treasury Bill  Tier 1 Non-Financial CP 
1 week  13bps  20bps 
1 month  15  19 
3 month  15  27  
 
The premium on the more liquid 1 week bill relative to the 3 month bill is only 2 basis 
points. The premium on the more liquid 3 month bill relative to 3 month CP is only 12 
basis points.  The latter premium also reflects some credit risk and tax effects.  Part of the 
reason why liquidity premia are so low is that government policy had already provided a 
large supply of liquid assets to the private sector.  Consider that the Fed had already 
increased bank reserves substantially. At the end of the third quarter of 2008, reserve 
balances totaled $222bn.  At the end of the second quarter of 2010, reserve balances 
totaled  $973bn  (Flow  of  Funds,  Table  L.109).    Furthermore,  the  government  had 
increased the supply of Treasury bills from $1,484bn to $1,777bn over this same period 
(U.S.  Treasury,  Monthly  Statement  of  the  Public  Debt  of  the  United  States).  These 
arguments  suggest  that  the  effects  on  liquidity  premia  should  be  negligible  via  the 
liquidity channel. 
 
  There is no evidence for a credit risk channel as the CDS rates rise, especially for lower-
grade  bonds.  This  may  indicate  that  QE2  (unlike  QE1)  did  not  have  a  substantial 
stimulating effect on the economy. It is also possible that the increase in CDS rates (as 
opposed to simply unchanged CDS rates) is due to the market inferring from the Fed’s 
decisions to pursue QE2 that the economy was in worse shape than previously thought. 28 
 
 
  Table 7 provides data on inflation swaps and TIPS yields for the event dates to analyze 
effects  on  inflation  expectations.  Inflation  expectations  rise  with  QE2.    The  10  year 
inflation swap rises by 5 bps, while the 30 year inflation swap rises by 11 bps.  The 10 
year TIPS falls by 25 bps. Comparing this number to the CDS-adjusted fall in the Aaa 
(Baa) long bond, implies that inflation expectations rise by 14 bps (16 bps) at the 10-year 
horizon.  The implied volatility on swaptions falls by 3 bps, indicating a slight decrease 
in inflation uncertainty. 
 
c.  Summary and Discussion 
The QE2 data suggest three primary channels for this Treasuries-only policy.  The signaling 
channel lowered yields on 5-year bonds by 11 to 18 bps and on 10-year bonds by 11 to 12 bps 
depending on estimation method used..  The safety channel lowered yields on low-default risk 
10-year bonds by an additional 5 to 10 bps.  Furthermore, there is significant evidence for an 
increase in inflation expectations (5 to 16 bps over the 10-year horizon), suggesting that real 
rates fell for all borrowers.  The main effect on the nominal rates that are most relevant for 
households and many corporations -- mortgage rates and rated on lower-grade corporate bonds -- 
was thus through the signaling and inflation channels, as opposed to resulting from a portfolio 
balance effect via the QE2 Treasury purchases.  
 
Our finding that signaling plays a primary role in QE2 is consistent with the market’s reaction to 
the August 9, 2011 FOMC statement which stated that: “The Committee currently anticipates 
that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for 
inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal 
funds rate at least through mid-2013.” From August 8 to 9, Treasury rates declined by 12, 20, 
20, and 12 bps at the 3, 5, 10, and 30 year maturities, respectively. An important question is thus 
whether the Fed could have achieved the signaling and inflation impact on yields seen in the 
Treasuries-only policy of QE2 from a commitment as in the August 9, 2011 statement, and thus 
without taking on additional balance sheet risk. 
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It is also interesting to contrast the channels in the QE2 policy to the channels in the QE1 policy, 
and consider the Fed’s QE3 action on September 21, 2011 in this light.  We find that the main 
channel in lowering MBS rates (and thus household mortgage rates) and corporate borrowing 
rates in QE1 is a portfolio balance effect via the MBS purchases during a time of market stress 
(and its associated effects on the housing market and the real economy).  We also find a smaller, 
but still sizeable, signaling effect in QE1.  The QE2 channel for MBS and corporate borrowing 
rates appears to be entirely through the signaling effects.  QE3 involves both purchases of long-
dated  Treasuries  (funded  by  corresponding  sales  of  shorter  maturity  Treasuries)  as  well  as 
investments in Agency MBS. Here are the two relevant parts of the September 21, 2011 FOMC 
statement:  
“The  Committee  intends  to  purchase,  by  the  end  of  June  2012,  $400  billion  of  Treasury 
securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years and to sell and equal amount of 
Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 3 years or less.”  
and, “the Committee will now reinvest principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and 
agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities.” 
 
Our QE1 and QE2 analysis suggests that QE3 effects for MBS and corporate borrowing rates 
should  work  through  a  signaling  effect  and  a  portfolio  balance  effect  based  on  the  MBS 
purchases. The latter effect should be smaller than during QE1 because market conditions were 
less stressed in September 2011 than in late 2008/early 2009 and MBS purchases were larger 
QE1 than in QE3.   
 
From September 21 to 22, long-term interest rates decline substantially and across the board. The 
largest decline of 23 bps is in the 30 year MBS (as previously based on averaging the yield on 
the current coupon Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac securities), with the comparable 
duration 10 year Treasury declining by 7 bps, 10 year Agency declining by 2 bps, and corporate 
rates from the long Aaa to Baa category declining by between 15 and 17 bps. These moves are 
plausibly  affected  by  an  MBS  risk  premium  channel  with  attendant  effects  for  corporate 
borrowing rates, as in QE1 On the other hand, the market responses differ in three other ways to 
QE1.  First, the federal funds futures contract barely moves (the 24
th month contract falls by 1 
bp), suggesting a negligible signaling channel.  It is possible that the August 9, 2011 statement 30 
 
reduced the amount of room remaining for rate reductions via the signaling channel.  Second, 
default risk rises, with 5 year investment grade CDS rising by 8 bps and high yield CDS rising 
by 34 bps. (We do not have firm-level CDS data for the QE3 period. The CDS numbers reported 
are based on data from Markit obtained via Datastream, using Markit series CDXIG516 and 
CDXHY516.) The rise in perceived default risk despite an observed decrease in corporate bond 
yields is unlike QE1 and is puzzling to us. One possible answer is that there is other news 
affecting financial markets that day which also moves asset prices.  When we look at asset price 
changes intraday, we find that the Treasuries and MBS rates decline sharply within the minutes 
after the announcement.  That same day the S&P 500 index declines by around 3%, but the bulk 
of this decline occurs a full hour after the FOMC announcement.  Thus it is possible that bad 
news affected the market later in the day, which drives up CDS rates and drives down all yields. 
We do not have intraday data on corporate bond yields and CDS to evaluate this hypothesis.  
Finally, unlike both QE1 and QE2, inflation expectations measured from inflation swaps are 
down 8 bps at the 30 year horizon and 4 bps at the 10-year horizon.   It is possible that since QE3 
involved no change in the monetary base, markets perceived the operation to not be inflationary.  
Moreover, both the increased default risk and the decrease in inflation expectations could be 
driven by the markets updating their odds of a slowdown in economic growth.
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5. Regression Analysis of the Safety Channel 
The event-study evidence is useful in identifying channels for QE. While it provides guidance on 
the magnitudes of the effects through QE, it is hard to precisely interpret the numbers because 
                                                           
14 Another interesting case study for QE is from the UK in 2008/2009. Joyce, Lasoasa, Stevens, and Tong (2010) 
examine the effects of QE in the UK. As with QE2 in the US, the UK QE consisted of purchases of long-term 
government  bonds  (totaling  200  billion  pounds).    Joyce  et.al.  document  that  QE  led  to  large  reductions  in 
government bond yields, smaller effects on investment grade bonds and more erratic effects on non-investment 
grade corporate bonds. They find only small effects on derivatives measures of future policy rates (to capture the 
signaling effects).  The authors do not consider the effects on MBS rates, CDS rates, or expected inflation. It would 
be interesting to revisit the UK QE evidence explicitly in the framework of our channels approach. Regarding our 
long-term safety channel, a few observations from the UK experience are striking. Joyce et al.  (Chart 7) find that 
on the first QE event date gilt yields move dramatically out to a maturity of 15 years, with sharply smaller effects 
on yields just longer than 15 year maturity, suggesting that the market did not expect bonds beyond 15 year 
maturity to be purchased. On the second QE event date, the Bank of England announced that maturities purchased 
would be 5 to 25 years. On that date, yields on bonds from 15 to 25 year maturity declined sharply more than 
yields on bonds between 5 and 15 years, and yields on bonds just above 5 year declined much more than yields on 
bonds just below 5 years. This suggests the presence of investors with preferred habitat demand for very safe 
bonds of particular maturities and the absence of sufficient arbitrage activity from other investors to smooth out 
the impact of announced gilt purchases across the yield curve. 31 
 
event study measures are dependent on the dynamics of expectations through the event.  That is, 
the asset market reaction depends on the change in the expectation of QE over the event. We 
have no direct way of precisely measuring such an expectations change, nor determine whether 
the event study is likely to over- or understate the effects of QE.  In addition, the QE1 event 
occurs in highly unusual market conditions, so that it is hard to extrapolate numbers from that 
period to more normalized conditions.  As such, it is valuable to find alternative approaches to 
estimating the impact of QE. In this section, we use regression analysis to provide such estimates 
focusing on the long-term safety channel. 
 
a.  Regressions 
We  build  on  the  regression  analysis  from  Krishnamurthy  and  Vissing-Jorgensen  (2010)  to 
estimate the effect of a purchase of long-term securities via the safety channel. We focus on the 
safety channel because it appears to be a dominant effect from the event studies and because long 
time-series of historical data exist to elaborate on this channel.   
  The regression approach we have taken in prior work can be explained through Figure 1.  
Consider the yield (or price) difference between a low default risk bond, such as a Treasury, and 
a Baa bond.  This yield difference includes both a default risk premium due to standard risk 
considerations and a safety premium component due to clientele demands for particularly safe 
assets.  We disentangle the default risk and safety premium by observing that the safety premium 
is decreasing in the supply of safe assets, including Treasuries, while the default risk component 
can be controlled for using empirical default measures. The empirical approach is to regress the 
Baa-Treasury spread on the supply of Treasuries as well as standard measures of default. 
As we explain in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010), the Baa-Treasury spread 
reflects both a liquidity premium, since Treasuries are much more liquid than corporate bonds, 
and a safety premium.  The Baa-Treasury spread is thus likely to result in an overestimate of the 
safety premium.
15 We therefore also consider the spread between Baa and Aaa rated corporate 
bonds (as we did for QE). The coefficient from the Baa-Aaa regression is a pure read on the 
safety premium,  because  Baa bonds  and Aaa bonds  are equally illiquid.  However, it is  an 
                                                           
15  Note that as discussed above, in QE the liquidity effect of changes in Treasury supply works to increase Treasury 
yields relative to yields on less liquid assets because the QE Treasury purchases were financed by reserves and thus 
represented an increase in the supply of liquidity. In general, however, a reduction in the supply of Treasuries 
available to investors will not be associated with a change in reserves and will thus reduce the supply of liquidity 
and thus reduce Treasury yields relative to less liquid assets such as corporate bonds. 32 
 
underestimate of the safety effect as may be reflected in Treasuries or Agencies because while 
Aaa are safe, they still contain more default than Treasuries or Agencies. For example, Moody’s 
reports that over 10 years, the historical average default probability of a bond that is rate Aaa 
today is 1% (while it is likely close to 0% for Treasuries and is close to 10% for Baa bonds). We 
note that an alternative spread to capture the price of long-term safety would be Treasury yields 
minus duration matched Fed funds futures (following our approach to estimate the safety channel 
for QE with the exception that agency yields could not be used historically due to their higher 
risk before the government takeover). However, Fed funds futures contracts are not available far 
enough back to allow meaningful regressions in annual data.  
  In  Krishnamurthy  and  Vissing-Jorgensen  (2010),  we  mainly  focus  on  the  effect  of 
changes in the total supply of Treasuries, irrespective of maturity, on bond yields.  For evaluating 
QE, we are interested more in asking how a change in the supply of long-term Treasuries (and 
agency bonds) will affect yields.  Accordingly, we construct a maturity-based measure of debt 
supply  as  follows.  For  each  Treasury  issue  in  the  CRSP  Monthly  US  Treasury  Database,  we 
compute the market value of that issue multiplied by the duration of the issue divided by 10.
16 
We normalize by 10 to express the supply variable in “ten-year equivalents.”  We then sum these 
values across Treasury issues with remaining maturity of 2 years or more. Denote the sum as 
LONG-SUPPLY.  We also construct the (unweighted) market value across all Treasury issues 
(TOTAL-SUPPLY), including those with a remaining maturity of less than 2 years. 
  We then regress the spread between the Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield and the long-
term Treasury yield (Baa-Treasury), or between the Moody’s Aaa corporate bond yield and the 
long-term  Treasury  yield  on  the  ln(LONG-SUPPLY/GDP)  instrumented  by  TOTAL-
SUPPLY/GDP,  and  squares  and  cubes  of  TOTAL-SUPPLY/GDP.    The  regression  includes 
default controls of stock market volatility (i.e., standard deviation of weekly stock returns over 
the preceding year) and the slope of the yield curve (10 year Treasury yield minus 3-month 
yield). Data sources are as described in detail in Krishnmurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010).  
The regressions are estimated via 2SLS, with standard errors adjusted for an AR(1) correlation 
structure.  It is important to instrument for LONG-SUPPLY because the maturity structure of 
government debt is chosen by the government in a way that could be correlated with spreads. 
                                                           
16 We use monthly data on prices and bond yields from the CRSP Monthly US Treasury Database base to 
empirically construct the derivative of price with respect to yield, see the data appendix.  The derivative is then used 
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TOTAL-SUPPLY is strongly related to LONG-SUPPLY and plausibly exogenous to the safety 
premium.  See Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) for further details of the estimation 
method. The regressions are estimated using annual data from 1949 to 2008. The regression is: 
 
                                                       ⁄        
 
instrumented by TOTAL-SUPPLY/GDP, and squares and cubes of TOTAL-SUPPLY/GDP. 
The  term                        ⁄    is  the  premium  of  interest  in  this  regression.  We 
evaluate the effect of a QE by evaluating this premium term at the pre-QE and post-QE values of 
LONG-SUPPLY. 
  The β coefficient is -0.83 (t-statistic = -5.83) for the Baa-Treasury spread For the Baa-
Aaa spread, the result is -0.31 (t-statistic = -4.64). 
   
b.  Estimates for QE1 
Gagnon,  et.  al,  (2010)  report  that  in  10-year  equivalents  the  Fed  had  purchased  $169bn  of 
Treasuries, $59bn of Agency debt, and  $573bn of Agency MBS by Feb 1, 2010.  The total 
purchase up to this date was $1.625tn and the anticipated total was $1.725tn.  We scale up the 
numbers up to Feb 1, 2010 by 1.725/1.625 to evaluate the effect of the total purchase. 
  Agency debt  and Treasury debt  are  almost  equally safe  during the QE period, while 
Agency MBS carries prepayment risk.  Thus, if we consider only the Treasuries and Agencies 
purchased,  and  ask  what  effect  this  will  have  on  the  Baa-Aaa  spread  using  the  regression 
coefficient of -0.31, we find that the effect is 4 bps (we also use the fact that the end of 2008 
LONG-SUPPLY/GDP = 0.140 for this computation).  As we have noted, this is smaller than the 
true safety effect because Aaa corporate bonds are not as safe as either Agencies or Treasuries.  
As an upper bound, even if we use the Baa-Treasury coefficient (which includes a liquidity 
premium),  the  estimate  is  11  bps.    Although  the  event  study  may  not  identify  the  precise 
economic impact of QE via the long-term safety channel for reasons we have discussed earlier, 
our regression estimates still appear quite small. This suggests that had QE1 taken place at an 
``average’’ demand for safety (as estimated by our regressions), its effects via the safety channel 
would have been much smaller than what we observed.  34 
 
  However,  we  have  neglected  an  important  aspect  of  the  crisis.  The  regressions 
coefficients are estimates of an “average” demand for safety; for evaluating QE we are more 
interested in the demand function as of the Fall of 2008 and Winter of 2009.  It is likely that 
demand during the crisis was elevated relative to an average period.  One way of seeing this is to 
note that the CDS-adjusted Baa spread minus the CDS-adjusted Aaa spread averages 1.58% in 
the sample from 11/24/08 to 3/1923/09.  This number is an estimate of the relative safety value 
of  the  Aaa  bonds  over  the  Baa  bonds.    We  can  also  estimate  the  historical  average  safety 
premium by evaluating ln(LONG-SUPPLY/GDP) at the 2008 level and multiplying by the -0.31 
coefficient. This computation yields 0.61%.  That is, the safety premium over the QE period was 
roughly 2.5 times the average level. The larger effects obtained from the QE1 event study than 
the regression approach suggest that changes in Treasury supply have much larger impact on the 
safety premium in times of unusually high safety demand than they do in average times.  
 
c.  Estimates for QE2 
In  QE2,  the  Fed  announced  that  it  would  purchase  $600bn  of  Treasuries  and  rollover  the 
maturing MBS into long-term Treasuries. We suggested earlier that the latter effect translates to 
a purchase of $220bn over the next year, and $176bn for the following year, if the policy was 
kept in place.  For the sake of argument, let us suppose that the market expects the policy to be in 
place for only one year then the total effect is to purchase $820bn of Treasuries.  
  The impact of an $820bn Treasury purchase can have a large effect on safety premia.  
However, QE2 occurs during more normalized market conditions, so that the -0.31 coefficient 
estimates are likely to be appropriate during this period.  For example, the CDS-adjusted Baa 
spread  minus  the  CDS-adjusted  Aaa  spread  averages  0.60%  in  the  sample  from  8/9/10  to 
9/22/10, which is similar to the historical average safety premium reported above. 
  The  $820bn  of  Treasuries  translates  to  $511bn  of  10-year  equivalents,  based  on  the 
planned maturity breakdown provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
17  The LONG-
SUPPLY/GDP ratio at the end of 2009 was 0.165.  Based on these numbers, using the -0.31 
coefficient, we find that QE2 should increase the safety premium by 7 bps. Using the upper 
bound  coefficient  of  -0.83,  we  estimate  an  effect  of  21  bps.    These  numbers  are  roughly 
                                                           
17 http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/lttreas_faq.html 35 
 




We document that the Federal Reserve’s purchase of long-term Treasuries and other long-term 
bonds ("QE1" in 2008-2009 and "QE2" in 2010-2011) significantly lowered nominal interest 
rates  on  Treasuries,  Agencies,  corporate  bonds,  and  mortgage-backed  securities,  but  with 
magnitudes that differed across bonds, across maturities, and across QE1 and QE2.  There are 
several primary channels for these effects. Three of these are operative in both QE1 and QE2, 
with the other three only operative in QE1. For both QE1 and QE2 we find significant evidence 
for: (1) a signaling channel which drives down the yield on all bonds (with larger effects on 
intermediate than long-term bonds), (2) a long-term safety channel through which  yields on 
medium and long maturity safe bonds fall because of a unique clientele for safe nominal assets, 
and Fed purchases reduce the supply of such assets and hence increase the equilibrium safety-
premium, and (3) an inflation channel with evidence from both inflation swap rates and TIPS 
showing that expected inflation increased, implying larger reductions in real than nominal rates. 
The three additional channels for QE1 are: (4) a MBS risk premium channel lowering yields on 
MBS (quantitative easing impacted mortgage-backed security yields by more than the signaling 
effect  for  QE1  but  not  QE2  indicating  that  another  main  channel  for  QE  is  to  affect  the 
equilibrium price of mortgage-specific risk if QE involves purchases of MBS), (5) a default 
risk/default risk premium channel lowering yields on corporate bonds, and (6) a liquidity channel 
through  which  QE  financed  by  reserves  affects  (increases)  yields  on  the  most  liquid  bonds 
relative to less liquid bonds of similar duration. We find no evidence for an impact of QE on the 
duration risk premium. 
Our results have three main policy implications. First, it is inappropriate for central banks 
to focus only on Treasury rates as a policy target because Treasury rates are driven by safety 
effects that do not carry over to mortgage and lower-grade corporate borrowing rates. Second, 
the beneficial effects of QE for mortgage and lower-grade corporate rates of the Fed’s asset 
purchases  are  highest  when  these  purchases  involve  non-Treasury  assets  such  as  mortgage-
backed securities.  Last, a Treasuries-only policy such as QE2 has effects primarily through a 
signaling channel whereby the market lowers its anticipation of future federal funds rates. An 36 
 
important question is thus whether the Fed could have achieved the signaling impact via a direct 
commitment as in the August 9, 2011 statement, and thus without taking on additional balance 
sheet risk. 
The principal contribution of our work relative to research on QE in the US (D’Amico 
and King (2010), Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2010) and Hamilton and Wu (2010)) is 
that by analyzing the differential impact of QE on a host of interest rates, our findings shed light 
on the channels through which QE affects interest rates.  While the prior literature does not 
discuss the channels for QE in as much detail as we do, it points to the operation of QE through 
two potential channels: the signaling channel as well as a “portfolio-balance channel.”  Brian 
Sack, the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Open Market Desk, describes the 
portfolio balance channel as follows:
18 
 
By purchasing a particular asset, the Fed reduces the amount of the security that the private 
sector  holds,  displacing  some  investors  and  reducing  the  holdings  of  others.  In  order  for 
investors to be willing to make those adjustments, the expected return on the security has to fall. 
Put differently, the purchases bid up the price of the asset and hence lower its yield. These effects 
would be expected to spill over into other assets that are similar in nature, to the extent that 
investors are willing to substitute between the assets. These patterns describe what researchers 
often refer to as the portfolio balance channel. 
 
In  thinking  about  the  portfolio  balance  channel,  it  is  key  to  understand  which  assets  are 
substitutes for those which the Fed purchases.  Relative to prior work, we have fleshed out the 
portfolio-balance  channel  in  more  detail.  We  have  considered  specific  finance-theory  based 
versions of the portfolio-balance channel, each indicating how assets may substitute for others in 
terms  of  their  duration  risk,  pre-payment  risk,  default  risk,  degree  of  extreme  safety,  and 
liquidity. One portfolio-balance channel that emerges as substantial for both QE1 and QE2 is that 
QE works partially through a safety channel affecting extremely safe long and medium-term 
bonds. Investors have a unique demand for low-default-risk assets of particular maturities. When 
the Fed purchases a large quantity of such assets, investors bid up the price on the remaining 
low-default-risk assets, decreasing the yields on these assets.  The safety channel highlights the 
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substitutability of assets within a (low) default-risk class. In other words, the safety channel can 
be thought of as a preferred-habitat for particular maturities, but only applying to low-default-
risk assets. This channel differs from the duration-risk channel. Under the duration-risk channel, 
the key dimension of substitutability is duration risk QE has an effect on long-term rates by 
reducing the duration risk held by investors, and thereby reducing the term premium on longer 
term assets.  When the Fed removes duration from the portfolios of investors, the investors 
substitute by purchasing other long-duration assets to make up for the lost duration.  Longer 
duration assets, which substitute better for the removed duration vis-à-vis short duration assets, 
fall the most in yield.  We do not find support for the operation of the duration-risk channel. 
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Figure 2. Intra-day Yields and Trading Volume on QE1 Event Days 















Panel B. Trading Volume 
 
Note: This figure is based on data purchased from BG Cantor and the data graphed is for the on-
the-run 10 year bond at each date. Yields graphed are averages by the minute and trading volume 
graphed is total volume by minute. The vertical lines indicate the minute of the announcement, 











Figure 3.  Yield Curves from Fed Funds Futures, pre- and post QE1 Event Days 
 
Note: The figure graphs the yields (in %) on the federal funds futures contract, by contract 
maturity.  The yields are computed the day prior to the QE1 event dates and again the day after 
the event dates.  All of the pre-event yields, and all of the post-event yields, are then averaged 
across events. All data are from Bloomberg. 
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Figure 4. Intra-day Yields and Trading Volume on QE2 Event Days 















Panel B. Trading Volume 
 














Figure 5.  Yield Curves from Fed Funds Futures, pre- and post QE2 Event Days 
 
Note: The figure graphs the yields (in %) on the federal funds futures contract, by contract 
maturity.  The yields are computed the day prior to the QE2 event dates and again at the end of 
the trading day of the event dates.  All of the pre-event yields, and all of the post-event yields, 
























Table 1. Treasury, Agency and Agency MBS yields on QE1 event dates 
Two-day changes (in basis points) 
Date  Event    Treasuries yields (constant 
maturity) 
Agency yields  Agency MBS 
yields 










30   
year 
10 year  5 year  3 year  30 year  15 
year 
11/25/2008  Initial 
announce- ment  -24  -36  -23  -15  -2  -57  -76  -57  -42  -72  -88 
12/1/2008  Bernanke 
speech  -27  -25  -28  -15  -13  -52  -67  -50  -33  -14  12 
12/16/2008  FOMC 
statement  -32  -33  -15  -4  -5  -37  -39  -26  -25  -26  -16 
1/28/2009  FOMC 
statement  31  28  28  19  4  33  28  27  14  31  20 
3/18/2009  FOMC 
statement  -21  -41  -36  -24  -9  -31  -45  -44  -35  -27  -16 
Above 5 dates  Above 5 events  -73
*  -107






*  -88 
 
Note: The Treasury yields are from FRED (the constant maturity series). The agency yields are for Fannie Mae bonds and the MBS 
yields are averages across the current coupon Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds.All are from Bloomberg.* denotes 
significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and *** denotes significance at 1% level.   2 
 
Table 2. Corporate Yields, and Corporate Yields Adjusted by CDS on QE1 Event Dates 
Two-day changes (in basis points) 
Corporate Yields 














int  Aa int  A int 
Baa 
int  Ba int  B int 
11/25/2008  -28  -18  -23  -19  -4  4  -17  -15  -18  -18  1  -47 
12/1/2008  -24  -24  -21  -17  -13  28  -21  -15  -18  -8  -5  6 
12/16/2008  -43  -37  -45  -39  1  -11  -19  -21  -24  -27  -28  -42 
1/28/2009  34  17  17  14  -16  -25  12  8  7  3  -32  -25 
3/18/2009  -16  -21  -21  -20  -28  -39  -43  -50  -39  -26  -18  -22 












Credit Default Swaps (10 year maturity)  Credit Default Swaps (5 year maturity) 
 
Aaa  Aa  A  Baa  Ba  B  Aaa  Aa  A  Baa  Ba  B 
11/25/2008  -1  10  -17  -13  -31  -798  -1  -6  -20  -18  -32  -573 
12/1/2008  1  0  9  11  21  1  1  3  13  7  28  33 
12/16/2008  -2  -8  -18  -17  -23  -308  -2  -15  -20  -21  -40  -172 
1/28/2009  -3  -15  -6  -13  -26  -231  -3  -7  -9  -11  -27  -255 
3/18/2009  -2  -1  0  -7  -18  -18  -2  8  2  -8  -27  -25 
Above 5 
dates  -7








                          Corporate Yields-Credit Default Swaps 
 













int  Aa int  A int 
Baa 
int  Ba int  B int 
11/25/2008  -27  -28  -6  -6  27  802  -16  -9  2  0  33  526 
12/1/2008  -25  -24  -30  -28  -34  27  -22  -18  -31  -15  -33  -27 
12/16/2008  -41  -29  -27  -22  24  297  -17  -6  -4  -6  12  130 
1/28/2009  37  32  23  27  10  206  15  15  16  14  -5  230 
3/18/2009  -14  -20  -21  -13  -10  -21  -41  -58  -41  -18  9  3 
Above 5 dates  -70  -69  -61  -41  18  1311
**  -82
*  -76  -59  -25  16  861
** 
 
Note: The corporate yield indices are from Barclay's and downloaded from Datastream.  The CDS rates by ratings are constructed 
from data from CMA and downloaded from Datastream, and using ratings from FISD, and information needed to calculated value-
weighted averages obtained from FISD (issue sizes) and TRACE (prices). * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes 







Table 3. Inflation Swaps, TIPS, and Implied Interest Rate Volatility on QE1 Event Dates 
Two-day changes (in basis points) 














11/25/2008  Initial 
Announcement  1  -6  -28  48  -22  -43  5  1 
12/1/2008  Bernanke 
speech  15  27  12  -40  -38  -34  -52
1  -7 
12/16/2008  FOMC 
Statement  4  37  35  -17  -45  -57  -83  -20 
1/28/2009  FOMC 
Statement  14  15  -6  5  15  6  13  0 
3/18/2009  FOMC 












Note: Inflation swap rates and interest rate volatility (ticker BBOX) is from Bloomberg. TIPS yields are from FRED. * denotes 
significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 
    
                                                           
1 The constant maturity TIPS data from the FRED website indicates that the 5 year TIPS fell by 244 bps on the 12/1/2008 event.  We think this is 
a data error. Using data from FRED on the 5-year and 10-year underlying TIPS bonds with remaining maturities near 5 years around QE1 (the 5-
year TIPS maturing 4/15/2013 and the 10-year TIPS maturing 1/15/2014), we found yield changes of -58 bps (for the 5-year TIPS maturating 
4/15/2013) and -46 bps (for the 10-year TIPS maturing 1/15/2014). We report the average of these changes, -52 bps, in the table.  4 
 
Table 4. Federal Funds Futures Yields over QE1 and QE2 Event Dates 
QE1, two-day changes (in basis points) 
Date  Event  Fed Funds Futures, Contract Maturity 
    3
rd month  6
th month  12
th month  24
th month 
11/25/2008  Initial Announcement  -6  -5  -8  -16 
12/1/2008  Bernanke speech  -6  -3  -7  -20 
12/16/2008  FOMC Statement  -13  -15  -10  -11 
1/28/2009  FOMC Statement  -1  -1  -1  19 
3/18/2009  FOMC Statement  -2  -4  -8  -11 
Above 5 dates  Above 5 events  -28
*  -27  -33
**  -40 
 
QE2, one and two-day changes (in basis points) 
Date  Event  Changes  Fed Funds Futures, Contract Maturity 










8/10/2010  FOMC statement  1-day  0  0  -2  -3 
   
2-day  0  0  -3  -8 
9/21/2010  FOMC statement  1-day  0  -1  -3  -8 
   
2-day  0  -1  -3  -8 
8/10 and 9/21   
1-day  0
***  -1  -4
***  -11
*** 
   2-day  0




Note: All data are from Bloomberg. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and *** denotes 

















Table 5. Treasury, Agency and Agency MBS Yields on QE2 Event Dates 
One and two-day changes (in basis points) 
Date  Event  Changes  Treasuries yields (constant maturity)  Agency yields  Agency MBS 
yields 












5 year  3 year  30 
year 
15 year 
8/10/2010  FOMC   1-day  -1  -7  -8  -3  -1  -2  -7  -8  -4  -1  -4 
 
statement  2-day  -8  -14  -10  -3  -1  -8  -13  -9  -7  -4  -8 
           
 
 
           
9/21/2010  FOMC   1-day  -8  -11  -9  -5  0  -8  -11  -9  -6  -8  -8 
 
statement  2-day  -13  -16  -10  -5  -1  -14  -16  -10  -6  -4  -5 
           
 
 
           
11/3/2010  FOMC   1-day  16  4  -4  -2  0  13  5  -5  -3  -4  -4 
   statement  2-day  11  -10  -11  -6  -1  4  -10  -14  -8  -10  -9 
8/10 and 




















***  -8  -13
** 
 
Note: Data sources are as for QE1. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and *** denotes 
significance at 1% level.   6 
 
Table 6. Corporate Yields, and Corporate Yields Adjusted by CDS on QE2 Event Dates 
One and two-day changes (in basis points) 















A int  Baa 
int 
Ba int  B int 
08/10/2010  1-day  0  3  1  1  -3  -9  -4  -2  -2  -3  0  6 
  2-day  -10  -5  -7  -7  -3  -5  -8  -5  -6  -6  9  23 
9/21/2010  1-day  -9  -9  -9  -8  -7  2  -9  -9  -10  -10  -4  -3 
  2-day  -13  -12  -13  -11  -15  1  -10  -8  -10  -11  -3  2 
11/3/2010  1-day  10  11  12  9  28  -1  -2  -2  -1  -1  -1  -5 
  2-day  5  2  4  -1  22  -10  -10  -11  -13  -14  -12  -18 
8/10 and  1-day  -9  -6  -8  -7  -10




**  -4  3 









***  6  25
** 
  Credit Default Swaps (10 year maturity)  Credit Default Swaps (5 year maturity) 
   
Aaa  Aa  A  Baa  Ba  B  Aaa  Aa  A  Baa  Ba  B 
08/10/2010  1-day  -1  5  2  2  4  4  1  5  3  4  5  9 
  2-day  0  10  7  7  16  23  1  15  7  9  20  26 
9/21/2010  1-day  2  -3  0  0  2  4  -1  -1  0  0  4  4 
  2-day  3  0  2  2  9  8  1  3  3  4  11  12 
11/3/2010  1-day      No            No       
  2-day      data            data       
8/10 and  1-day  2  2  2  2  6  8  0  4  3  4  9  13 
9/21  2-day  3  10  10
**  8
*  25





***  38 
  Corporate Yields-Credit Default Swaps 
 














Aa int  A int  Baa int  Ba int  B int 
08/10/2010  1-day  1  -2  -1  -1  -7  -13  -5  -7  -5  -7  -5  -3 
  2-day  -10  -15  -14  -14  -19  -28  -9  -20  -13  -15  -11  -3 
9/21/2010  1-day  -11  -6  -9  -8  -9  -2  -8  -8  -10  -10  -8  -7 
  2-day  -16  -12  -15  -13  -24  -7  -11  -11  -13  -15  -14  -10 
11/3/2010  1-day      No            No       
  2-day      data            data       
8/10 and  1-day  -11  -8**  -10*  -9  -16***  -15  -13***  -15***  -15***  -17***  -13***  -10 
9/21  2-day  -26***  -27***  -30***  -26***  -43***  -35  -20***  -31***  -26***  -30***  -25***  -13 
 
Note: The corporate yield indices are from Barclay's and downloaded from Datastream.  The CDS rates by ratings are constructed 
from data from CMA and downloaded from Datastream, and using ratings from FISD, and information needed to calculated value-
weighted averages obtained from FISD (issue sizes) and TRACE (prices). * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes 





Table 7. Inflation Swaps, TIPS, and Implied Interest Rate Volatility on QE2 Event Dates 
One and two-day changes (in basis points) 












30 year  10 
year 
5 year 
8/10/2010  FOMC   1-day  5  -1  -3  0  -7  -9  -8  -2 
 
statement  2-day  -2  0  -3  -4  -5  -9  -5  -3 
             
  
   
  
9/21/2010  FOMC   1-day  6  6  6  -1  -13  -16  -14  -1 
 
statement  2-day  6  4  7  9  -18  -20  -18  -2 
             
  
   
  
11/3/2010  FOMC   1-day  6  -3  2  1  8  1  -6  -2 
   statement  2-day  1  -11  4  14  12  -5  -14  -3 
             
  
   
  
8/10 and 9/21 
 
1-day  11











Note: Data sources are as for QE1. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and *** denotes 
significance at 1% level. 
 